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Selected Legal Aspects of China's
Conduct of Foreign Trade
The Chinese Conception of Law
To better appreciate the distinctive character of the legal aspects of China's
conduct of foreign trade, a brief inquiry into the Chinese conception of law, in
general, is in order.
In traditional China there was a dichotomization of law into the 1i and the
fa. Thefa was the written or positive law. It was essentially a punitive, after-
the-fact device operating to control socially unacceptable behavior. The /i, on
the other hand, was an individually internalized device for achieving social
control. The 1i was a body of approved behavior patterns to be learned by men
so that they might behave properly. It functioned to achieve social differentia-
tion essential to a society based largely on status relationships.' The 1i was to
be preventive rather than punitive.
Both 1i and fa have striking counterparts in contemporary China. These
have been referred to as the "external" and the "internal" models of law.'
The external model is based on formal, usually written sets of rules defining
permissible and impermissible conduct. It is analogous to thefa. The internal
model posits that proper behavior is to be learned through a continuing educa-
tional and socialization process. This model is somewhat consistent with the
traditional concept of i, as well as with ideological (the mass line principle),
economic (underdeveloped economically) and pragmatic (lack of legal special-
ists) exigencies in contemporary China.3 One difference between the internal
model and the traditional 1i is that, rather than functioning to achieve social
differentiation based on status, the present internal model is attempting to
create a new man, a classless man, in accordance with an ultimate goal of
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achieving a classless society.4 For a variety of reasons concerning China's
recent development, the internal model is currently ascendant. However, the
external model continues to operate and to interact with it.'
The Chinese conception of law as an internalized mode of structuring, or at
least influencing, behavior has been characterized, by Western legal standards,
as reflecting a legal posture ranging from indifference to lawlessness. A
moderate view has it that:
(China's) approach to law enforcement and adjudication is not highly "legalistic"
in the sense of reliance on statutes and institutional procedures for their application
and interpretation. Rather, the party approaches this problem with perspectives
derived from its ideology and the Chinese legal tradition, which tend to weaken legal
formalities and to shift legal functions away from the specialized structures officially
designed to perform them.'
The important question, for present purposes, is: to what extent does the
Chinese conception of law, as largely informal and unwritten, affect their view
of the role and operation of international trade law?
Perhaps the most important effect is that China has no commercial code.
The consequences of this are manifold. Principally, when Chinese law is to be
applied in a foreign trade dispute, it is extremely difficult to know what that
law is. In addition, the near non-existence of a legal profession in China, and
the lack of judicial institutions for dispute resolution, probably bear upon the
strong preference of the Chinese to resolve foreign trade disputes by negotia-
tion, rather than by arbitration.7
One cautionary note, however, is that one should not take the informal
Chinese attitude towards the law as an indication of a lack of acumen, on the
part of China, when it comes to their actual conduct of foreign trade. It has
been said that:
It ... is quite clear that the Chinese are well informed about the technical aspects of
international trade-a fact that is a bit surprising given their de-emphasis of law in
domestic matters.'
Politics and Trade
Trade is not something conducted in a vacuum or in the abstract. On the contrary,
it is an aspect of the overall behavior of a society and reflects the same attitudes and
concerns that affect that society's actions in other areas.'
'CHEN, supra, p. 206.
'Li, op. cit.
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The preceding statement is particularly apposite to China, where the interplay
between politics, society and trade is intimate. Politics and its ideological cur-
rents are in constant flow throughout the contemporary Chinese society; their
endemic nature being a concomitant of an ongoing socialist revolution or
transformation.
As a part of this transformation, foreign trade has come to exist as a state
controlled monopoly. In the state controlled foreign trade apparatus, as in the
other state run activities, the people who wield effective control of its govern-
mental and non-governmental aspects are members of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP). The party members provide the physical link between politics
and trade. In theory, at least, foreign trade is supposed to be run in a manner
that will promote, where possible, the ongoing socialist transformation.
Politics is to take command over trade.
From the early days of the Chinese Communist regime, the concept of self-
reliance has been of extreme importance. Regarding foreign aid, it was said
that: "We stand for self-reliance. We hope for foreign aid but cannot depend
on it; we depend on our own efforts. ... ", These sentiments applied with
equal force to foreign trade. It was thought that independent, self-reliant
development, though slower and possibly more arduous than development
through foreign trade, fostered desirable political and social values that were
more in step with the spirit of the ongoing revolution. Another important
reason for the desire for development through self-reliance-a reason perhaps
more practical than ideological-was that, prior to the communist take-over,
China had been badly misused by foreign countries through grossly unfair
trade practices.
The desire for self-reliance did not mean that foreign trade was ignored. The
People's Republic of China did engage in foreign trade and began it rather
early. Her initial trading partners were members of the Soviet bloc. However,
over the years, there has been a shift in orientation away from the Soviet bloc
traders to the Western European countries and Japan. This is largely attribut-
able to the estrangement with Russia and, in no small part, to the likelihood
that China could get better trading terms with the Western European countries
and Japan.
The commitment to self-reliance, though modified in certain respects, con-
tinues to this day. Certainly, the rhetoric remains.
China's foreign trade achievements are the results of the policy of building the
country independently, through self-reliance, hard struggle, diligence and thrift, con-
sistently followed by the Chinese people.'
"Mao Tse-tung, We Must Learn To Do Economic Work, SELECTED WORKS, VOL. III, (Jan. 10,
1945) p. 241.
"Wang Yao-ting, China's Foreign Trade, PEKING REVIEW vol. 17, no. 41 (Oct. 1I, 1974) p. 19.
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It is fair to say, though, that China's adherence to self-reliance in economic
development, while continuing to be espoused as an ideological construct, has
become quite "pragmatized." That is, China continues to value the socialist
construction advantages inhering in self-reliance, but, at the same time, recog-
nizes the practical, economic advantages of foreign trade. China recognizes
that there are some things-technologies and raw materials-that she doesn't
have and that she needs. Yet, China wants to obtain these things in a way that
respects the commitment to self-reliance. To use a well-worn phrase, China
wants to have her cake and eat it too. One way that she keeps from starving
while remaining true to her political beliefs is by trading for entire plants,
rather than for the things the plants produce.
But it does not stop here. China's interest in foreign trade is not limited to
grudgingly entering into trading contracts to obtain technologies or materials
to enhance her ability to be self-reliant. China exhibits, if not a zest, at least an
enlivened interest in making trade with her more appealing to foreigners. For
example, China has shown an interest in "improving packing and packaging
and increasing varieties and designs" of her export commodities. 2
The impact of politics on trade, then, is not so great as it once was, and not
even so great as it is claimed to be now. China has become more practical and
less political in conducting foreign trade. Nevertheless, because of the fact that
party members are largely in control of the trade apparatus, and because
China has, in recent years, been highly volatile, politically, a potential for
political disruption of trade does exist.
The Machinery of Trade
The foreign trade of China does not just happen. It is, instead, conducted as
a state monopoly by established organs in accordance with a central or master
plan. Speaking metaphorically, it could be said that the Chinese have built a
foreign trade machine. From time to time, the government (which receives
direction from the party) decides what it needs to get from this machine,
makes the proper adjustments and settings, and hopes that it produces the
desired results. Being a machine, it is made up of a number of component
parts working together to produce foreign trade. The most important parts
are: the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the state trading corporations, the China
Council for Promotion of International Trade, and the Canton Trade Fair.
The Ministry of Foreign Trade
The Ministry of Foreign Trade is the government entity possessed of the
"official" capacity for the conduct of China's foreign trade. The Ministry for-
''Id. at 19.
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mulates and submits annual import and export plans to the State Council for
its approval. Once the plans are approved, the Ministry is charged with super-
vising their implementation. Some of the responsibilities of the Ministry in-
clude: the development of trade relations with other countries; the negotiation
of trade agreements; and the supervision of the Chinese Customs Administra-
tion and the China Commodity Inspection Bureau. The Ministry does not ac-
tually do the trading. That is done by the state trading corporations, which
operate under licenses issued by the Ministry.
The Ministry, then, through its official administrative, supervisory and
licensing functions, exercises near total control over the international trade en-
vironment of China. A resultant characteristic of this control is an extreme
centralization of the trade process. An interesting aspect of this extreme cen-
tralization, from the perspective of China's trading partners, is that by dealing
only with the official, centralized trade apparatus, the foreign sellers do not
have direct contact with the end users of their products. Consequently, a seller
is able to obtain only an inexact and incomplete picture of who the intended
user is and of what the product will be used for.
State Trading Corporations
The actual business of trading is carried out by the state trading corpora-
tions, organized and existing under licenses from the Ministry of Foreign
Trade. These corporations are the sole importers and exporters in China, and
it is with them, ultimately (there are companies outside of China that act as go-
betweens), that foreign traders must deal in negotiating and concluding con-
tracts. The state trading corporations are organized along mutually exclusive
lines to trade in particular commodities. At present, there are eight such cor-
porations:' 3
China National Machinery Import & Export Corporation
China National Chemicals Import & Export Corporation
China National Metals and Minerals Import & Export Corporation
China National Textiles Import & Export Corporation
China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Import & Export Corporation
China National Light Industrial Products Import & Export Corporation
China National Native Produce and Animal By-Products Import & Export
Corporation
China National Technical Import Corporation
The state trading corporations possess independent juridical personality
enabling them to enter into contracts with foreigners. Accordingly, they can
sue and be sued on their contracts. However, they can be held liable only to the
"China Trade Guide (New York: First National City Bank, 1975) p. 6.
International Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 4
646 INTERNATIONAL LA WYER
extent of the capital appropriated to them by the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
For example, during any given year, the Ministry might capitalize a particular
corporation, say the China National Chemicals Import & Export Corporation,
with an amount of money thought to be sufficient to enable the corporation to
carry out its part of the overall trade plan. Should the trading corporation be
sued in damages for breach of one of its contracts, its liability would be limited
to the capital appropriated to it by the Ministry. In essence, then, the state
trading corporations possess the juridical capacity to contractually bind them-
selves to the extent of their assets, but they cannot bind the other trading cor-
porations or China as a government.
China Council for Promotion of International Trade
Whereas the Ministry of Foreign Trade is the "official" governmental trade
body, the China Council for Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) is
billed as the "unofficial," non-governmental component of China's foreign
trade machine. It can be likened to a chamber of commerce that operates at the
international level. Though the CCPIT is ostensibly an independent body, it,
in fact, works closely with the Ministry of Foreign Trade in furtherance of
China's trade program.
The CCPIT is made up of state trading corporation representatives and ex-
perts in economics, trade and law. Its functions include: arranging trade exhi-
bitions, sending exploratory trade missions abroad, and entertaining trade
missions in China. The major undertaking of the CCPIT is that of arranging
and conducting the Canton Trade Fair twice each year. Consequently, the
CCPIT plays a major role in establishing trade with non-communist countries
that don't have diplomatic relations with China. In addition, the CCPIT is
responsible for settling disputes through its Foreign Trade Arbitration Com-
mittee and Arbitration Tribunal, and for registering trademarks. The CCPIT
is viewed as having independent legal personality. It can, and does, make trade
agreements-as distinguished from trade contracts, which are made by the
trading corporations-in its own name. 4
Canton Trade Fair
The Canton Trade Fair, conducted semi-annually in the spring and fall, has
been the principal forum for conducting foreign trade. As noted, it is run by
the CCPIT. As much as 50 percent of the total foreign trade for certain years
has been conducted at the Fair. It is at the Fair that contracts are negotiated
and often concluded. Attendance is limited to those who have been invited by
"A.H. Smith, Standard Form Contracts in the International Commercial Trade Transactions of
the People's Republic of China, 21 I.C.L.Q. 133 (1972).
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the Chinese. The manners and methods of negotiating at the Fair are
fascinating and should be looked into.' 5
The importance of the Fair as a forum for trade may be expected to decline
in the coming years. This is because more and more foreign traders' are finding
it possible to deal directly with the state trading corporations and bypass some
of the formalities and delays of the Fair. However, the Fair should continue to
be of importance to those first attempting to trade with China. This is because
the Chinese are concerned about developing a good overall trade relationship.
Fleeting affairs are not sought. The initiation of a lasting relationship cannot
be hastened, but will continue with the slow, "feeling each other out" atmo-
sphere of the Fair.
Contracts
In General
Recognizing the difficulties with generalizing, but being unable to resist, a
few modest generalizations are set out below.
1. In spite of the seeming indifference with which the Chinese regard law
domestically, they take foreign trade contracting with utmost seriousness.
2. Where possible, the Chinese use their own standard form contracts for
buying and selling.
3. Modification of the terms of China's form contracts, while not often
easy, is, nonetheless, possible.
4. In practice, the Chinese behave reasonably under contracts that, by their
terms, seem to favor China.
5. An English-speaking trading partner can expect to have the contract
drawn up in English, or English and Chinese, often accompanied by a
statement that both languages are of equal authenticity.
6. Contracts contain no mention of the legal system that will govern per-
formance. 6
7. Where China is the buyer the contracts often contain a fairly detailed
quality guarantee clause.' 7 Such a clause is generally absent from con-
tracts where China is the seller.
Shipping Documents and Terms
Almost all of the import contracts of China are F.O.B. In short, F.O.B.
means that the seller of goods to China will be responsible for delivery of those
goods on board a vessel at the port of shipment specified, the seller assuming
'M. F. Klingenberg, The Canton Trade Fair: The Initiation of United States-Chinese Trade, 13
VA. J. INT'L L. 63 (1972).
"DOING BUSINESS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Hong Kong: Business International,
1973) p. 68.
"Smith, supra, p. 147.
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all risks relating to the goods until the goods are so delivered or tendered for
delivery. Note that the contracts won't necessarily employ the term F.O.B.
but, rather, the wording will be consistent with the usual understanding of the
term.
The export contracts of China are generally C.I.F. In short, C.I.F. means
that the Chinese seller will be responsible for chartering space on a vessel,
loading the goods, and paying freight and insurance. The seller assumes all
risks until the goods are delivered within a specified time.
In practice, when China is the purchaser, the seller must provide detailed
shipping and other documents. However, when China is the seller, reference to
shipping documents may be omitted or discussed in vague, general terms.'8
Where China is the exporter, the standard form contract permits transhipment
and partial shipment. However, where China is the importer, transhipment
may be specifically prohibited.' 9 Finally, the contracts often go into detail on
shipping and packing instructions.
Insurance
Standard form contracts almost invariably provide that China will insure
the transacted goods, whether China is the buyer or the seller. This situation is,
of course, a concomitant of the fact that China normally buys F.O.B. and sells
C.I.F. One possible explanation for the Chinese willingness to arrange for in-
surance is the existence of the People's Insurance Company of China. The
People's Insurance Company handles international trade and maritime risk in-
surance and writes all common forms of insurance, including war risk.2" When
China is the seller, the goods are usually insured at 110 percent of their invoice
value.2 ' Additional coverage may be had by paying an additional premium. 2
Inspection of Goods
China does not recognize any international inspection organizations. In-
stead, its contracts provide for the inspection and testing of goods by the
China Commodity Inspection Bureau. The Bureau has offices in China's
major ports and industrial and transportation centers. It is responsible for en-
suring that imports and exports meet the required standards. 3
The usual inspection process for imports is as follows: the goods arrive at




"DOING BUSINESS . ., supra, p. 70.
"China Trade Guide, supra, p. 10.
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Bureau for inspection of quality, quantity, specifications, and weight of the
goods; and the Bureau issues the appropriate certificate.2" If there are any dis-
crepancies, China has the right to reject the goods or claim against the seller. A
party dissatisfied with the result of the inspection may apply for a re-inspec-
tion. If still dissatisfied, the party may petition for review by the government
agency having jurisdiction over the Bureau. However, the dissatisfied party
may be held liable for the re-inspection expenses and for costs resulting from
the delays.2"
The Chinese inspectors are known to be extremely meticulous and uncom-
promising in applying the standards that the goods must meet. They may reject
goods for the slightest non-conformity.2 6 Since inspections are so rigorous and
rejections a real possibility, great care should be taken to ensure that the
description contained in the documents relating to the goods is exact. This is
because in conducting the inspections the inspectors rely on the descriptions
contained in the accompanying documents. An example of where an inexact
description resulted in a rejection that could have been avoided was where a
company shipped goods containing improvements made since the contract was
concluded, and failed to correct the old description.2 7
An important legal consequence of the inspection requirement is that the
contract may appoint the China Commodity Inspection Bureau the final ar-
biter of whether or not goods conform. That is, the inspection certificates are
used as conclusive and irrebuttable evidence by the Chinese in pressing claims
arising from non-conforming goods.28 This arrangement is somewhat at odds
with what most Western lawyers would be comfortable with. However, it may
be necessary to accept such a provision, and European experience suggests that
Chinese corporations insist on the finality of the Bureau's certificate.29
Force Majeure
The meaning and content given to force majeure clauses may differ accord-
ing to the legal systems of individual countries. That is, each country will at-
tempt to determine, for itself, what circumstances should be force majeure for
contract purposes.
In the case of China, not all contracts have force majeure clauses and, when
they do, what constitutes force majeure is not always spelled out.3" In general,
21J. A. COHEN, CHINA TRADE PROSPECTS AND U.S. POLICY (Alexander Eckstein, ed.) (New
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"Id. at 128.
International Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 4
650 INTERNATIONAL LA WYER
it would include war and natural disasters, but apparently not strikes or labor
disruptions.3' In any event, it seems clear that when an event would be con-
sidered force majeure, there is an obligation on the party seeking to invoke the
clause to seasonably notify the other party. At present, Western experience
under Chinese force majeure clauses is very limited.
An interesting question is whether modification by Chinese authorities of a
state trading corporation's ability to perform its contractual obligations would
qualify as force majeure. For example, what if the Ministry of Foreign Trade
modified its import and export plans so as to make performance on an
outstanding contract impossible for a state trading corporation? Could that
corporation rely on a force majeure clause to escape its obligations?
The answer is unclear. One author has argued that there should be no escape
from liability." He reasons that such an application of force majeure is not
traditionally recognized and that each party should bear the risks inhering in
its own government's behavior. In support of this view, it could also be argued
that an act of the Ministry of Foreign Trade is not an act external to the state
trading corporation (because of state control over the trade apparatus), hence,
not force majeure. However, in Jordan Investments Ltd. v. Soiuznefteksport,
English translation in 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 800 (1959), the Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Trade cancelled an export license, thereby preventing a Soviet state
trading corporation from performing on its contract. The Arbitration Com-
mission held that the force majeure clause was broad enough to excuse the cor-
poration from liability.
Payment Terms
International trade contracts with China are of the type known as documen-
tary transactions. Under them, payment is not made against the goods, but
against documents evidencing the legal right to possession of the goods by the
holder of the documents. The usual international practice in documentary
transactions is by an irrevocable letter of credit against the presentation of a
sight draft and shipping documents. The Chinese practice has some notable
differences.
The first is that in sales by China the letter of credit must reach the seller
(China) before the date of shipment and remain valid until fifteen days after
expiration of the shipment date. This produces the seemingly unsettling situa-
tion where the buyer has committed his letter of credit but may, for a period of
time, be without either the goods or the documents. Yet, while this is theoret-
ically unnerving, there have been no reports of serious problems arising from
this situation.
"R. Starr, Developing Trade with China, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 13, 20 (1972).
"Reghizzi, supra, p. 108.
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Another important difference is one resulting from the inclusion of inspec-
tion clauses in the contracts. The clauses condition acceptance of the goods on
a satisfactory inspection. When this condition is viewed together with an
F.O.B. sale to China, there is a peculiar result. An F.O.B. sale should mean
that the risk of loss passes, and the buyer's liability arises, upon delivery of the
goods on board the vessel. This is when the irrevocable letter of credit should
be irrevocable. Yet, acceptance and payment is conditioned upon a satisfac-
tory inspection which doesn't take place until the goods are in China. In a
theoretical sense, the inspection clause operates to transform what is supposed
to be an irrevocable letter of credit into a conditional promise to pay. Again, it
does not appear that this has caused serious problems.
Another difference concerns the use of confirmed letters of credit. It is the
usual practice in international trade to use confirmed letters of credit. A
regular letter of credit, inter alia, is irrevocable and issued by a financing agen-
cy of good international repute. A confirmed letter of credit has these
characteristics and, in addition, carries the direct obligation of the confirming
agency. As a general rule, China, while requiring its trading partners to deal in
confirmed letters of credit, will not do so itself. It is thought that to insist on
China's use of confirmed letters would imply doubt about the credit standing
and good faith of the country. Not wishing to offend China and, thereby,
possibly damage the trading relationship, trading partners do not ordinarily
insist. Another reason for going along with the practice is that China has, in
fact, a very good payment record, making confirmed letters generally un-
necessary.
China often insists that letters of credit in its favor be transferable, but they
don't appear to be, in fact, transferred, at least not outside the country.33
Finally, letters of credit are negotiated by the Bank of China and may be
opened only through certain third country banks having correspondent rela-
tions with the Bank of China.3 '
The currency used in international trade transactions with China has in-
cluded most Western European currencies, the Japanese yen, and the U.S.
dollar. Since 1970, there appears to have been an effort by China to have its
own currency, the renminbi (RMB), used more frequently. When the RMB is
used for payment, it must be purchased from the Bank of China.
For years, contracts for sales to China had been based on cash payments ex-
clusively. More recently, however, the Chinese have indicated a willingness to
purchase on credit. Examples are the purchases of ethylene and butadiene
plants from the Tokyo Engineering Corporation of Japan, a vinylon plant
from Kurary, and a third plant from Mitsubishi. The terms are said to provide
"Smith, supra, p. 141.
"DOING BUSINESS . . ., supra, p. 70.
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for a 20 percent down payment with the remainder payable with interest at 6
percent over a five-year period."
Terms Relating to Breach
The standard form contracts of China usually do not contain provisions
covering a possible breach by China. This situation is not the result of an over-
sight on China's part. Nor is it likely the result of intentional, underhanded
maneuvering to gain an unfair advantage over the other party. Rather, it is
probably the result of an attitude that refuses to put into question the potential
bad faith or bad acting of China towards its contractual obligations.
On the other hand, China's standard form contracts commonly contain pro-
visions relating to breach by the foreign trading party. These provisions in-
clude, inter alia, the right to compensation or penalties for late delivery or
defects, and the right to terminate upon breach. Compensable damages in-
clude the loss of future profits.36 The inclusion of penalties as a possible
recovery for breach is not a universally popular idea. What makes penalties so
harsh is that, even when they are paid, they don't necessarily release the
breaching party from the obligation to perform or from payment of
damages.37 In practice, the Chinese insistence that penalties be paid has
varied. 8
Another interesting factor is China's strong preference for specific perfor-
mance over money damages as a remedy for breach. This attitude results, in
part, from the fact that China's foreign trade exists as an integral part of the
nation's overall economic plan. Consequently, there often exists a crucial rela-
tionship between a particular foreign trade contract and the implementation of
a carefully thought out domestic economic project. Since the fulfillment of
economic plans is a matter of primary importance to the Chinese government,
money damages are often a poor substitute for the performance of a contract.
Foreign traders can expect, then, that China will strongly insist on the often
more drastic remedy of specific performance.
Disputes Settlement
The most important thing to stress in the area of dispute settlement is that
the Chinese are extremely reluctant to resort to arbitration despite the fact that
dispute settlement by arbitration is a well-established practice in international
commercial law. The Chinese prefer, instead, to settle contractual disputes
through negotiation.3 9
35LUBMAN, supra, p. 134.
"Smith, supra, p. 150.
"Reghizzi, supra, p. 105.
"LUBMAN, supra, p. 135.
"Smith, supra, p. 138.
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The preference for negotiation can be explained in terms of both traditional
and contemporary attitudes. Traditionally, the Chinese did not favor litigation
as a means of settling disputes. This disfavor is reflected in the proverb: "It is
better to die of starvation than to become a thief; it is better to be vexed to
death than to bring a lawsuit." 4 Instead, the Chinese favored mediation and
compromise. This is because they sought a means of dispute resolution that
would not adversely affect the overall relationship between the parties, the
overall relationship being highly valued in Confucian thought. The li/fa
dichotomy also comes into play here. Li stresses that reasonable men should
deal with their opponents with propriety and tolerance to produce a spirit of
compromise. Where fa, the formal law, is resorted to, the implication is that
the party failed to behave as a reasonable man would have. Hence, the desire
to avoid formal litigation.
In addition, there are contemporary iceological reasons for preferring
mediation over arbitration or litigation. In terms of Maoist-Marxist-Leninist
thinking, civil disputes (and this would include commercial disputes) are
thought to belong to what are called "contradictions among the people." 4 '
Contradictions among the people, unlike some other types of contradictions,
are not suited to be suppressed. Consequently, all or nothing adjudicatory pro-
cedures are inappropriate. Resolution through negotiation and compromise is
to be preferred. 2
Finally, the preference for negotiated settlement derives, in part, from
economic considerations. As already noted, specific performance is preferred
over damages when there is a breach of contract. The possibility of obtaining
performance, even if only partial, is likely to be increased through amicable
negotiations. Resort to arbitration will tend to freeze the parties to their
respective positions following the alleged breach.
One further point to make in this regard is that, because disputes are settled
through negotiation, it doesn't mean that decisions are reached in disregard of
understood principles of law. It would be careless to jump to the conclusion
that negotiated resolution is unprincipled or mere serendipity. In an account
relating to the use of mediation at the domestic level in China, it was said:
[W]e must guard against the phenomenon of using imagination instead of policy.
.. The view that mediation can be on the sole basis of the willingness of the parties
without paying attention to policy and law is wrong and harmful.43
"Id. at 138.
"T.W. Huang, Reflections of Law and the Economy in the People's Republic of China, HARV.
INT'L L. J. 261, 278 (1973).
"See J. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1201 (1966);
and S. Lubman, Mao and Mediation, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1284 (1967).
"Huang, op. cit., p. 279.
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Negotiation, then, is strongly preferred. However, most trade contracts with
China do make provision for arbitration in the event that a settlement cannot
be reached through negotiation. The terms of the arbitration agreement are
not always the same but depend upon the bargaining power of the parties, and
the nature of the commodity traded.4 1 In general, the arbitration clauses ex-
hibit a preference for arbitration in China. However, the Chinese have ac-
cepted clauses providing for arbitration in the defendant's country or a third
country, such as Switzerland or Sweden.45
If a dispute is referred to arbitration, the Foreign Trade Arbitration Com-
mittee (FTAC), the likely arbiter, will provide the procedural and substantive
rules. The FTAC has twenty-one members. Each party to the dispute may
choose one arbitrator from the members. The two arbitrators (assuming two
disputants) then select a third arbitrator from the remaining members to act as
a referee. In lieu of the foregoing selection procedure, the parties may agree on
a single arbitrator. The parties may be represented by lawyers, though Chinese
is the official language of the Committee. The meetings are open, unless a
party requests that they be closed. When handing down the decision the
reasons behind it must be stated. The decision unless a party requests that they
be closed. When handing down the decision the reasons behind it must be
stated. The decision is final.
The subject matter jurisdiction of the FTAC includes disputes "as may arise
from contracts and transactions in foreign trade." 6 Personal jurisdiction may
be exercised only on a voluntary basis, and upon written application of one of
the parties to the dispute.47
There is a question as to what substantive law would be applied in arbitra-
tion, as the contracts do not state the legal system that governs performance. 8
Presumably, choice of law will be left up to the forum state. But since China is
usually chosen as the forum state, and since China has no substantive body of
rules on choice of law in private international commercial disputes, foreign
traders can only guess what law will be used.
In fact, disputes rarely, if ever, go to arbitration. The Chinese preference for
negotiation is well known to China's trading partners. There is a widespread
feeling among them that an insistence on arbitration (though permitted by
contract) would severely jeopardize future trade. In practice, what generally
happens when the CCPIT receives a complaint is that one person, a "foreign
"V. H. Li, Legal Aspects of Trade With Communist China, 3 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 57, 63
(1974).
4'Smith, supra, p. 139.
'Article I of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Committee of
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, adopted March 31, 1956.
'
71d., Art. 11.
"Smith, supra, p. 138.
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trade expert," is selected who may or may not be a FTAC member. This per-
son investigates and proposes a compromise solution."9 Regarding the actual
settlement of claims, the Chinese prefer to settle them through future business
dealings, rather than by money payments."
Conclusion
The legal aspects of China's conduct of foreign trade are, in a number of
ways, unique. In general, trade is conducted in a highly unilateral fashion.
This is something uncommon in today's world of international trade. Both
traditional and contemporary notions of law interact to affect China's legal
approach to trade. Politics, while continuing to be of importance, does not im-
pact on trade the way it once did. The practical advantages of trade are being
given increasing recognition. As time passes, barring major political disrup-
tion, it can be expected that China will begin to adopt some of the more com-
mon approaches to structuring the legal relationships involved in foreign
trade. In the meantime, her "uncommon" approach to conducting foreign
trade needs to be recognized and dealt with accordingly.
49LUBMAN supra, p. 127.
"Haight, supra, p. 71.
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